Sunday, September 7, 2008

Liberal Foreign Policy Needs More Realism

It is a sad day for the liberal foreign policy establishment when the only person to turn to in the main stream media for straight talk about the Russia/Georgia situation is none other than paleoconservative Pat Buchanan. Read here for Pat’s spot-on analysis about how “the chickens of democratic imperialism have now come home to roost – in Tbilisi.”

The typical “liberal” point of view is put forth here by Roger Cohen of the New York Times. His prescription for how to respond to Russia puts him comfortably in bed with Dick Cheney:

The West [cannot] be cowed. It must shore up the Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, with financial and other support. It must keep the trans-Caspian, Russia-circumventing energy corridor open. It must bolster Ukraine’s independence. And, at the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in December, it should [establish]…a Membership Action Plan for Georgia and Ukraine.


The world seems like it's upside down: Pat Buchanan makes total sense, and most liberals (including Obama and Biden, by the way!) are basically endorsing the Bush Administration’s belligerent stance towards Russia. What is going on?

The reason for this craziness is not simply that Democrats are trying to act tough in an election year. There is a much deeper problem at the core of liberal foreign policy thinking—namely, the ascendance within the liberal community of a human rights-based worldview. Popularized by thinkers like Samantha Power (a former Obama adviser) and embodied in the idea of Responsibility to Protect, this worldview has much more in common with neoconservatism (the driving intellectual force behind Bush’s foreign policy) than liberals would like to admit.

First and foremost, both neoconservatives and human rights-oriented foreign policy thinkers share an idealistic and revolutionary zeal for transforming the world into a better place. In addition, they both believe that the internal character of regimes matters greatly to how America should interact with foreign governments. And thirdly, they both believe that America’s foreign policy should reflect the deepest values of liberal democratic societies. These commonalities inevitably lead to similarly aggressive attitudes towards autocratic countries like Saddam’s Iraq, Putin’s Russia, and Communist China. While neocons are motivated by fear of such autocratic regimes and a desire to promote American empire, human rights thinkers are motivated by disdain for such regimes and a desire to help their oppressed peoples. But in the end, the two group’s policy prescriptions are often the same. As Tony Judt says in his essay, “Bush’s Useful Idiots: On the Strange Death of Liberal America”: “In today’s America, neoconservatives generate brutish policies for which liberals provide the fig leaf. There really is no other difference between them.”

Pat Buchanan, on the other hand, is a foreign policy “realist.” His primary concern is America’s vital interests; words like “democracy” and “human rights” don’t enter into the equation. He correctly believes that America’s vital interest does not include going to the mat for a pseudo-democracy in Central Asia run by a loose-cannon president who will continue to antagonize Russia—a country that America needs to help further its true vital interests such as safeguarding nuclear weapons and dealing with Iran.

In my opinion, the liberal establishment should take a healthy dose of realist medicine from Pat Buchanan and rethink the practicality of placing human rights at the center of its foreign policy worldview.


For further reading on how to deal with Russia, check out: “To Russia with Realism: the White House senseless risks a new Cold War,” by Anatol Lieven.

And check out this must read, also by Anatol Lieven: Bipartisan Disaster: Americans' growing unease at US foreign policy is not reflected by the two parties.” It features this nugget: “If I have to listen to another American anti-Bush liberal damn the war in Iraq and then advocate US military intervention in Darfur I may eat my beard.”

4 comments:

Nate said...

I agree with the general point, but take exception to the quotation at the end. There are clear reasons why a Darfur intervention (or a Kosovo intervention, for that matter) makes sense, in a realist way, where the Iraq adventure does not. Firstly, a well-planned, well-executed intervention, made with the support of the international community, demonstrates the value of America's hegemonic power, and thereby serves as a good example of soft power, increasing our reputation abroad - this is important in working with other countries, particularly democracies, to accomplish our policy objectives.

Secondly, I believe we do have an interest in maintaining the Post WW-II international system, a system which includes the idea that genocide, whether committed inside or outside of one's own borders, is a crime in which the international community takes an interest. Now there are probably more effective ways of upholding that value than military intervention (becoming a supporter of the ICC, for example), but nonetheless I think that Darfur or Kosovo serve as examples of situations where rational self-interest and a concern for human rights are not mututally exclusive.

Peter said...

Nate,

Yes, the Kosovo intervention did make some sense from a realist perspective. Darfur, however, does not. I might agree with you that a “well-planned, well-executed intervention made with the support of the international community” would, in theory, be a good thing. But I’m afraid such an intervention is much harder to pull off than it is to imagine. Dreaming of such a successful operation was the same type of thinking that led many liberals to support the Iraq “intervention.” As Lieven says: “…there are no rational grounds for believing that a US military which has failed so badly in policing one bitterly-divided Muslim society would play a successful role in another.”

The obstacles standing in the way of America carrying out a successful intervention in Darfur are numerous. First, where will the invading army come from? There are no American troops to spare. But let’s say this army does materialize and America leads some sort of a coalition into Darfur. What next? How long are we willing to occupy this land? Are the American people really willing to invest the time and money required to transform Darfur into a peaceful and functioning place? Kosovo today serves as a good example of how difficult it is to get from “intervention” to “functioning society”—and the conditions in Kosovo are far more favorable to such a transition than they are in Darfur. And what will become of the fragile peace between the Khartoum government and southern Sudan Christians? And what will this do to our image in the Muslim world when we invade yet another Muslim country?...that has oil?!

Intervention is serious business. It requires a realistic and well-thought out plan for success. No such plan exists for Darfur. Outrage at genocide (which I, of course, share) is not enough.

Nate said...

Hmmm. My ignorance about Darfur - exposed!

OK, what about becoming a member of the ICC? I have yet to hear any really convincing argument about why we shouldn't do this, and it would lend credibility to an institution that has the potential to deter genocide. What's your thoughts on that?

Peter said...

I am of two minds on the ICC issue.

On the one hand, international law is a good thing in so far as 1.) international laws carry legitimacy in the eyes of the world because they are perceived to be universally shared and 2.) those laws are enforceable by a more or less democratic policing mechanism. I think the U.S. should become a member of the ICC—it will be a step in the right direction.

But I do have serious reservations about supporting the ICC in its current form. The big problem is that these supposedly universal international laws enforced by the ICC, in practice, only apply to those individuals and countries that are so weak as to be subject to the U.S./Western-dominated enforcement mechanism of those laws. In other words, you only get hauled off to The Hague if you are too weak to resist arrest. No American, Russian, or Chinese leader will ever be prosecuted in The Hague—no matter how terrible the war crimes they allegedly commit—because those countries and those leaders have access to lots of guns and soldiers. The hypocrisy that international law applies to the little guy but not to the great powers is pretty damning in my opinion.