Wednesday, December 10, 2008

On Naomi Klein, Russia, and Corruption

Naomi Klein is the shining star of the anti-corporate, anti-globalization progressive movement. Her latest book, The Shock Doctrine, is a worldwide best-seller, and she has attracted much interest of late now that her crusade against Milton Friedman and his laissez-faire economic policies seems to be vindicated by the recent financial meltdown. I recommend reading Larissa MacFarquhar’s profile of Klein in The New Yorker.

But despite being a card-carrying liberal, I am no fan of Naomi Klein.

Klein’s basic thesis in The Shock Doctrine is this: business interests (corporations) team up with the political powers that be (Washington, IMF, World Bank) to push through free market economic policies (deregulation and privatization) whenever there is a shock event (natural disaster, currency devaluation, regime change, terrorist attack). These policies end up enriching the few at the expense of the many.

One of the case-studies Klein cites in support of her thesis is the transition towards a market economy that took place in Russian in the early 1990s following the demise of the Soviet Union. Jeffrey Sachs, one of the Western economists who advised the Russian authorities at the time, labeled his economic policy suggestions (most conveniently for Klein) as “shock therapy.” Klein has this to say about the Western-led reorganization of the Russian economy:

Beginning in 1990, the [World] Bank led the charge for the former Soviet Union to impose immediately what it called "radical reform." When Mikhail Gorbachev refused to go along, Yeltsin stepped up. … After [Yeltsin] ordered army tanks to open fire on demonstrators in October 1993, killing hundreds and leaving the Parliament blackened by flames, the stage was set for the fire-sale privatizations of Russia's most precious state assets to the so-called oligarchs.

Russia is far from unique: From Chile's dictator Augusto Pinochet, who accumulated more than 125 bank accounts while building the first neoliberal state, to Argentine President Carlos Menem, who drove a bright red Ferrari Testarossa while he liquidated his country, to Iraq's "missing billions" today, there is, in every country, a class of ambitious, bloody-minded politicians who are willing to act as Western subcontractors. They will take a fee, and that fee is called corruption--the silent but ever-present partner in the crusade to privatize the developing world….In fact, corruption was embedded in the very idea of shock therapy.

This analysis is all well and good. Klein deserves commendation for “following the money” and documenting, in her book, the symbiotic relationship between big business and corrupt politicians.

Interestingly, it seems Vladimir Putin has been reading The Shock Doctrine, or more likely, he just happens to share Klein’s feelings about the post-Soviet economic upheaval in Russia. Since he came to power, Putin has been trying to institute a kind of economic justice in Russia by taking back—by hook or crook—a good part of what was stolen by the oligarchs in the 1990s. The most well known example of this re-nationalization was the takeover of Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s oil company, Yukos, by the state-run energy giant Gazprom. Khodorkovsky now languished in a prison in Siberia. More recently, Putin has been implementing a kind of reverse shock doctrine, by which he uses a crisis to turn Russia away from the Friedmanite model and towards a more state-controlled economic environment. The NYTimes reported that he is using the smokescreen of the current financial meltdown, together with the “natural disaster” of a giant sink hole created by a collapsed mine, to move in on an oligarch-owned mining company, Uralkali. From the Times:

The Kremlin seems to be capitalizing on the economic crisis, exploiting the opportunity to establish more control over financially weakened industries that it has long coveted, particularly those in natural resources.

“We will put capital directly into major companies, in cases when it would be beneficial to the state and eventually to the taxpayer, and in those enterprises that are the basis of the economy of the Russian Federation,” Mr. Putin said in a television appearance on Thursday. “We do not exclude that these tools may be used in a large-scale way.”

Go get ‘em, Vladimir! Take down those oligarchs! Naomi Klein approves … or does she?

I wonder how Klein feels about Putin’s attempts to even the score with the oligarchs who made off like bandits in the 1990s. I suspect that she, along with many of her progressive fans, might not be all that supportive of Mr. Putin. Perhaps she feels similar to the Russians cited in the Times article:

Russians undoubtedly have ambivalent feelings about oligarchs. They tend to resent the oligarchs’ wealth, believing that it was accumulated through underhanded means in the 1990s. But they also worry that government officials want to seize these assets for their own venal purposes, and that they will end up mismanaging them, just as in Soviet times.

This completely justified skepticism of Putin-style economic justice points towards a problem with the world-view of many progressives in the Naomi Klein camp. Namely, progressives are too reluctant to admit that corruption and bad behavior is not limited to capitalist actors alone, but is built into any governmental system. They are too quick to point the finger at corporations, and unwilling to see corruption as not simply self-generated by evil-doing rich guys but as a part of the governing process. Thinking of Putin’s Russia, it is easier to see that nationalization carries its own set of problems and its own inherent corruption, and that nationalization is not necessarily the best way to improve upon a corrupt privatized system.

With this in mind, Klein’s recent call to nationalize ExxonMobil, a very Putin-esque move, is terribly misguided. In her rush to punish the corrupting corporate actors, Klein offers up a solution that will simply shift the opportunity for theft from private actors (ExxonMobil) to public actors (bureaucrats). If all this makes me sound like a libertarian, that’s as it should be. Libertarians rightly see “nationalization” as a euphemism, in many instances, for the state stealing money from capitalists, just as progressives rightly see “privatization” as a euphemism, in many instances, for capitalists stealing money from the state.

The constant struggle towards better governance is to limit the abuse of the system—both by state actors and by corporate actors. That means nationalizing ExxonMobil is a bad idea . But it also means steps should be taken to limit the influence of corporate money in politics. Naomi Klein is half right: Milton Freidman-style economic policies are, indeed, fundamentally unjust. But pointing the finger only at corporations and saying the solution is to nationalize ExxonMobil is a flawed analysis. Illinois Gov. Bagojevich needed no prodding from any corporation to incentivize him to try to sell Obama’s Senate seat.

When Klein throws up her hands in disgust over the corruption built into the idea of “shock therapy,” the proper response is: “What? There’s gambling at Rick’s casino? Shocking.” Corruption will always be with us. The task is to minimize it.

3 comments:

Anonymous said...

Interesting piece ... I really don't think that the American left has a very good answer on what has happened in Russia in recent years. (it's just one of those issues where the far right and the far left bend all the way around to touch).

I would also be very careful in what we actually call a nationalization for the people of Russia, and the difference between that and the transfer of assets to one set of private hands into another set of private hands.

Check out our blog to read more on this kind of stuff.

Peter said...

James,

You are right about the far left and far right bending around to touch each other, forming a kind of bellicose anti-tyranny coalition. Our Russia policy is driven largely by these folks.

And thinking about what "nationalization" really means is also very helpful. Who is coming out ahead in the end? It's worth thinking about what "nationalization" would really look like in America. What exactly is Klein imagining when she says we should "nationalize" ExxonMobil?

Dr. Pickle said...

Peter is correct to highlight the limitations of Klein’s proposal to nationalize ExxonMobil, but he may want to consider several limitations of his own. Here’s a clinically oriented contribution to perspectives posted on the Pickle:

1) The general framework for Klein’s primary thesis – that transformative national and/or international events open “policy windows” that powerful political interests can take advantage of to promote their pre-conceived policy agenda – is not new. Political science is certainly not my field (I’m a physician and public health practitioner), and others (including Klein herself) may have highlighted the parallels previously, but her description of policy-making bears striking resemblance to David Kingdon’s famous “garbage can” model of policy formation (for a brief summary of his perspective, see http://www.metagora.org/training/encyclopedia/Kingdon.html ).

Kingdon describes three “streams”: of policy problems, policy prescriptions, and ‘politics’; and he provides empirical evidence from decades of experience in Washington to make the case that for the most part, these streams flow independently from one another, and that successful policy change occurs when two or more streams can be brought together. That is (to mix metaphors), if policy problems are diseases and policy prescriptions are drugs to treat those diseases, then policy is made most often either by reaching into the garbage can of pre-existing policy solutions when presented with a rapidly emerging policy problem (ie: developing a drug to treat the disease); or, conversely, by successfully identifying a policy problem that might justify a favored policy solution (eg: identifying a disease that your drug treats; a sequence that unfortunately is more common in medicine – and politics – than we might like). Kingdon recognized explicitly that transformative events (aka “shocks”) that may have no intrinsic relationship to either the disease or the problem (such as natural disasters or elections) provide particularly acute opportunities for policy-solution peddlers to push through their specific policy agenda. Sound familiar?

2) Klein’s insight, then, is not in her re-statement of Kingdon’s framework; rather, it is her application of (t)his framework to explore the forces behind foreign policy decisions made in the United States over the past half century (or longer). Within this context I agree with Peter that her analysis is dead-on. Borrowing from the lexicon of epidemiology, we might say that her theory has high “internal validity”; that is, the process of corporate interests shoving their pre-fabricated “free market” policy prescription down the throats of the rest of us, particularly during times of stress or shock, accurately describes the non-linear, non-rational formation of foreign policy in the United States. Caution should be used, however, when applying her particular focus on the corporate/capitalist origins of corrupt policymaking to other environments. As an epidemiologist, I agree with Peter that her model may lack “external validity” when applied to other countries, such as Russia, where policy formation is no more rational and no less corrupt, but the powerful interests may take form distinct from Klein’s “free-market capitalists”.

3) Peter appropriately points out the limitations of extrapolating Klein’s conclusions about American to Russian contexts; but he should apply similar caution and humility when extrapolating the Russian experience to the United States. Specifically, the lessons learned from Russia’s nationalization of oil may not apply to the decision to nationalize ExxonMobil. I agree with Peter that democratic justice may be threatened by corruption manifesting itself in myriad forms (from the corporate to the state); but Russia’s experience with “Putin style economic justice” does not by itself logically lead to Peter statement that “nationalizing ExxonMobil is a bad idea.”

Peter writes that “Naomi Klein is half right: Milton Freidman-style economic policies are, indeed, fundamentally unjust. But pointing the finger only at corporations and saying the solution is to nationalize ExxonMobil is a flawed analysis.” I would add to this, however, that Peter himself is only half-right (or is it ¼ right?): Putin-style nationalization may be fundamentally unjust, but pointing the finger only at government and saying the solution is NOT to nationalize ExxonMobil is also a flawed analysis.

4) Note that I am not taking a position on the ExxonMobil debate. A compelling argument exists to limit the distinctly undemocratic influence large corporations, such as ExxonMobil, in our government (and in our lives), but this does not necessarily translate into an argument either in favor (Klein) or against (Peter) nationalization as the correct policy solution. Now that Klein has re-introduced us to Kingdon’s model of policy formation and sensitized us to the undue influence of single-minded policymakers during times of “shock”, we have the tools to scrutinize her own prescription for nationalization, which strikes me as an example of the process she disdains: that is, the application of a favorite policy solution/drug to a problem/disease when a political window has opened during a time of crisis. Klein’s “shock doctrine” provides a valid description of problematic policymaking in the United States, but it may prove less useful as a tool to prioritize policy solutions. (In this regard, Klein is indeed similar to Kingdon, whose model has been criticized for its lack of specificity, and its inability to evaluate particular policy priorities.)

On the other hand, Peter knocks Naomi down by exposing the lack of external validity of her argument, but he builds his own argument against the nationalization of ExxonMobil on a similarly shaky foundation by extrapolating the pitfalls of Russian politics to the United States. Nationalization may indeed be wrong for the United States, but it is not because the process was executed poorly in Russia. That is, we may want to hesitate before trusting the world’s 18th-largest economy to a government composed of officials of Blagojevich’s caliber (big B, as John Stuart noted, was not only corrupt; he also “gave us a new low… in stupid”), but there also are many good reasons to limit the influence of the “smartest guys in the room” who work in the corporate sector.

5) If Naomi or Peter would like to make a case for or against nationalizing ExxonMobil, they might want to consult a clinician or an epidemiologist. The clinician can remind them to make sure they know how the drug came to be associated with the disease, and that a particularly sick patient does not necessarily justify a rush to prescribe a drug for an entirely new and unstudied indication. The epidemiologist can remind them to distinguish between internal and external validity: an internally valid study does not make it applicable to all settings; conversely, a lack of external validity does not threaten the logic of applying the study’s findings to the initial population .