Monday, November 17, 2008

Point-Counterpoint: MAP for Georgia and Ukraine?

The Pickle is delighted to bring the always robust Nate Truitt-Peter Richards comments section back-and-forth about Russia-Georgia onto the front page.

Point, by Nate:

In December of 2008 the foreign ministers of NATO countries will meet in Brussels to discuss, among other things, whether Georgia and Ukraine should be granted Membership Action Plans (MAP). The Membership Action Plan "is a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance." Although participation in MAP "does not prejudge any decision by the Alliance on future membership," the granting of a MAP to Georgia (and, to a lesser extent, to Ukraine) will be viewed by Russia as a virtual invitation to join the alliance - and, therefore, as a threat. This is especially true in the aftermath of the recent Georgian-Russian conflict over South Ossetia.

Granting a MAP to Georgia will be a bold, controversial move that many will interpret as aggressive and confrontational towards Russia. Moreover, many will object to NATO support of any kind for a Georgian regime that has had a highly questionable record on enforcing the rule of law and the observance of human rights. Nonetheless, it is vital that NATO countries come together and take the difficult step of granting both Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans.

The disproportionate Russian response to fighting in South Ossetia represented a clear violation of international law. It was, however, merely the latest and greatest example of an aggressive Russian policy towards former Soviet states: a policy of intimidation; constant meddling in these nations' internal political disputes; encouragement of separatist groups (especially along ethnic lines); and, generally speaking, actions designed to compromise the sovereignty of Russia's neighbors, thereby making them reliant on Moscow. These policies have been especially noticeable in Russia's relations towards two of its most independent-minded neighbors, Georgia and Ukraine. Before the recent conflict, Russia had long maintained a peacekeeping presence in Georgia despite strenuous objections from the government in Tblisi. And they had pledged support to South Ossetian and Abkhazian separatists, essentially destroying any incentives for those groups to negotiate with the Georgian government. Similarly in Ukraine, Russia was extremely antagonistic towards the Orange Revolution (according to some, they went so far as to participate in a plot to poison Viktor Yushchenko). They continue to raise the prices on fuel exports to Ukraine in order to make life for the new government extremely uncomfortable.

Russia's behavior towards other ex-Soviet Republics like Turkmenistan, Moldova and Belarus has followed similar patterns. It is of course inevitable that a strong regional power will attempt to exercise influence over the political behavior of its neighbors. When, however, those attempts manifest themselves in illegal behavior, including outright war, a line has been crossed and the international community then has a strong interest in creating and enforcing consequences for such behavior.

As long as these independent nations lack basic security and the ability to exercise their sovereignty without fear of a Russian veto, it's hard to see how any long-term stability can be achieved. The current situation - in which these nations drift along in fear and uncertainty, hanging on every word from Moscow - is simply not sustainable. Ukraine and Georgia sense this and their applications for MAPs are a reasonable attempt to protect their own independence.

Granting Georgia a MAP would send a clear signal to Moscow that NATO countries do not except the immoral, absurd and dangerous notion that somehow Russia has veto power over the policy of its independent neighbors, and that it can enforce that veto through military action. Admittedly, giving Georgia a MAP will antagonize Russia and lead to a short-term deterioration of U.S./European - Russian relations; but in the long term, a MAP for Georgia will promote security and stability by clarifying NATO's position on what is and is not an acceptable definition of Russian "national interests." A strong stance now will help defuse an otherwise-likely conflict in and over Ukraine; and will eventually lead to a better, more lasting friendship between the United States on Russia - one based on a clear understanding of the roles and limitations of both partners.


Counterpoint, by Peter:

The first problem with granting Georgia and Ukraine a MAP is that it would be an empty gesture with no teeth. There is basically no chance that a MAP will actually lead to either country joining the NATO alliance anytime soon. Georgia has unresolved border disputes with South Ossetia and Abkhazia that automatically preclude membership, while Ukraine has an extremely fragile internal political situation that would disintegrate into chaos if Ukraine were to join NATO. Even more obvious is American (and therefore NATO) reluctance to defend Georgia in case of Russian aggression. Georgia was not worth defending in August when Russian tanks rolled through Tskinvali. Why, then, would America seek to create a military alliance that would obligate it to such a defense of Georgia in the future? America would have to go to war with Russia if the reckless, hyper-nationalist Georgian president were to decide to have another go at invading South Ossetia. Clearly, a MAP for Georgia and Ukraine would not lead to NATO membership and is, therefore, a dead-end policy.

The sole purpose of the MAP, then, becomes the desire to “send a message to Moscow.” But wouldn’t it be wise for America to try to “send a message” by taking action that would have the potential for real follow-through? Spitting in someone’s eye when they know you won’t beat them with your stick simply antagonizes your enemy while showing you up as a coward. It is the opposite of Theodore Roosevelt’s famous dictum: “Speak softly and carry a big stick.”

And why, we should ask, must such a message be sent in the first place? Those on the right who wrongly believe Russia is returning to its imperial past, and those on the left who don’t like Russia’s abuse of human rights like to trot out a laundry list of recent Russian “bad behavior” that deserves “a strong response.” This laundry list is, indeed, quite dirty; but it must be put into its proper perspective. Russia, to be sure, has a laundry list of its own, showing what it believes to be American bad behavior in the region. At the top of the list is America’s embarrassing support of Saakashvili, the aggressor in the war in South Ossetia. In addition, America has undermined the idea of sovereignty by supporting independence in Kosovo, meddled in the internal politics of Ukraine, courted Central Asian dictators, and exited the ABM treaty. Let’s not fool ourselves: America hardly occupies the moral high ground when it comes to aggressive behavior in the region. And let’s not leave out American bad behavior in the rest of the world, most notably in Iraq and at Guantanamo. In short: American self-righteous anger at Russian “bad behavior that deserves a strong response” doesn’t carry much water these days.

Not only is granting a MAP bad policy for America to pursue; it is also bad policy for Georgia and Ukraine. A majority of people in Ukraine do not support the idea of a MAP; it is Ukrainian politicians, at the behest of America, who are pursuing NATO membership. Many Ukrainians, especially those who live in the eastern regions and speak Russian as their first language, do not wish to see Ukraine turn its back on Russia. There are strong cultural, commercial, and familial connections between the Russian and Ukrainian people that would be strained if Ukraine were to “choose the West.” A more natural and productive orientation for Ukraine (and Georgia) would be to balance itself between Russia and America, thereby staking out an independent and strong position. Such an orientation would also go a long way towards stabilizing Ukraine’s fragile internal political situation, while easing the over-all tension in the region.

And lastly, supporting the idea that Georgia and Ukraine should choose “the West” presupposes a Cold War-like antagonistic relationship between Russia and America, and then goes a long way towards making that presupposition a reality. But in today’s world, there is no longer the ideological conflict of Communism vs. Capitalism to drive a wedge between Russia and America. And there are actually a number of areas in which Russian and American interests converge, such as terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, and Afghanistan. Aggressively pursuing NATO expansion shuts the door to the possibility of cooperation in these areas while hardening each country into a confrontational stance.

In sum, granting Georgia and Ukraine a MAP would be a disaster on multiple levels: it would fail to forward American interests, it would destabilize Georgia and Ukraine, and it would put American-Russian relations on a clear path towards confrontation rather than cooperation.

2 comments:

Dan said...

I guess I'm in agreement more with Nate. Peter, I think your counterpoint has some contradictions. You are right to say that we're not going to put Georgia into NATO, at least in part because you're also right to say that we're not going to war with Russia to defend Georgia. But I don't agree that we don't have a moral high ground in the region, and I don't agree that it's wrong to think of Russia as resurgently imperialistic. A MAP for Georgia is a good way to say that we seriously think they crossed a line by going to war. They'll see it as a threat - they should; it is. That's why, even though it doesn't have teeth, it's a meaningful signal.

Peter said...

Dan, what evidence is there that Russia is resurgently imperialistic? And don't say the Russia-Georgia war. The war with Georgia gave no indication that Russia was or is interested in returning to its former Soviet glory. If that were the case, then Russian tanks would have rolled all the way into Tbilisi--there was nothing to stop them. The imperialistic argument is put forth by right-wing cold warriors who, somewhat understandably, find it difficult to think of Russia outside of that old framework. I would caution you against getting sucked into Cold War assumptions that no longer hold true.