Point, by Nate:
In December of 2008 the foreign ministers of NATO countries will meet in Brussels to discuss, among other things, whether Georgia and Ukraine should be granted Membership Action Plans (MAP). The Membership Action Plan "is a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance." Although participation in MAP "does not prejudge any decision by the Alliance on future membership," the granting of a MAP to Georgia (and, to a lesser extent, to Ukraine) will be viewed by Russia as a virtual invitation to join the alliance - and, therefore, as a threat. This is especially true in the aftermath of the recent Georgian-Russian conflict over South Ossetia.
Granting a MAP to Georgia will be a bold, controversial move that many will interpret as aggressive and confrontational towards Russia. Moreover, many will object to NATO support of any kind for a Georgian regime that has had a highly questionable record on enforcing the rule of law and the observance of human rights. Nonetheless, it is vital that NATO countries come together and take the difficult step of granting both Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans.
The disproportionate Russian response to fighting in South Ossetia represented a clear violation of international law. It was, however, merely the latest and greatest example of an aggressive Russian policy towards former Soviet states: a policy of intimidation; constant meddling in these nations' internal political disputes; encouragement of separatist groups (especially along ethnic lines); and, generally speaking, actions designed to compromise the sovereignty of Russia's neighbors, thereby making them reliant on Moscow. These policies have been especially noticeable in Russia's relations towards two of its most independent-minded neighbors, Georgia and Ukraine. Before the recent conflict, Russia had long maintained a peacekeeping presence in Georgia despite strenuous objections from the government in Tblisi. And they had pledged support to South Ossetian and Abkhazian separatists, essentially destroying any incentives for those groups to negotiate with the Georgian government. Similarly in Ukraine, Russia was extremely antagonistic towards the Orange Revolution (according to some, they went so far as to participate in a plot to poison Viktor Yushchenko). They continue to raise the prices on fuel exports to Ukraine in order to make life for the new government extremely uncomfortable.
Russia's behavior towards other ex-Soviet Republics like Turkmenistan, Moldova and Belarus has followed similar patterns. It is of course inevitable that a strong regional power will attempt to exercise influence over the political behavior of its neighbors. When, however, those attempts manifest themselves in illegal behavior, including outright war, a line has been crossed and the international community then has a strong interest in creating and enforcing consequences for such behavior.
As long as these independent nations lack basic security and the ability to exercise their sovereignty without fear of a Russian veto, it's hard to see how any long-term stability can be achieved. The current situation - in which these nations drift along in fear and uncertainty, hanging on every word from Moscow - is simply not sustainable. Ukraine and Georgia sense this and their applications for MAPs are a reasonable attempt to protect their own independence.
Granting Georgia a MAP would send a clear signal to Moscow that NATO countries do not except the immoral, absurd and dangerous notion that somehow Russia has veto power over the policy of its independent neighbors, and that it can enforce that veto through military action. Admittedly, giving Georgia a MAP will antagonize Russia and lead to a short-term deterioration of U.S./European - Russian relations; but in the long term, a MAP for Georgia will promote security and stability by clarifying NATO's position on what is and is not an acceptable definition of Russian "national interests." A strong stance now will help defuse an otherwise-likely conflict in and over Ukraine; and will eventually lead to a better, more lasting friendship between the United States on Russia - one based on a clear understanding of the roles and limitations of both partners.
Counterpoint, by Peter:
The first problem with granting
The sole purpose of the MAP, then, becomes the desire to “send a message to
And why, we should ask, must such a message be sent in the first place? Those on the right who wrongly believe Russia is returning to its imperial past, and those on the left who don’t like Russia’s abuse of human rights like to trot out a laundry list of recent Russian “bad behavior” that deserves “a strong response.” This laundry list is, indeed, quite dirty; but it must be put into its proper perspective.
Not only is granting a MAP bad policy for
And lastly, supporting the idea that
In sum, granting
2 comments:
I guess I'm in agreement more with Nate. Peter, I think your counterpoint has some contradictions. You are right to say that we're not going to put Georgia into NATO, at least in part because you're also right to say that we're not going to war with Russia to defend Georgia. But I don't agree that we don't have a moral high ground in the region, and I don't agree that it's wrong to think of Russia as resurgently imperialistic. A MAP for Georgia is a good way to say that we seriously think they crossed a line by going to war. They'll see it as a threat - they should; it is. That's why, even though it doesn't have teeth, it's a meaningful signal.
Dan, what evidence is there that Russia is resurgently imperialistic? And don't say the Russia-Georgia war. The war with Georgia gave no indication that Russia was or is interested in returning to its former Soviet glory. If that were the case, then Russian tanks would have rolled all the way into Tbilisi--there was nothing to stop them. The imperialistic argument is put forth by right-wing cold warriors who, somewhat understandably, find it difficult to think of Russia outside of that old framework. I would caution you against getting sucked into Cold War assumptions that no longer hold true.
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